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Florida's Past and Future Roles in Education Finance 
Reform Litigation 
Scott R. Bauries 
INTRODUCTION 
In federalist parlance, the states often are called laboratories of democracy.1 
Nowhere is this truer than in the field of education, and almost no subset of the 
education field lends itself to this label more than education finance. Since 1973, 
with very few notable exceptions, the entire development of the practice of edu- 
cation finance has proceeded through state-specific reforms.2 These reforms have 
occurred mostly through legislative policymaking, but the courts have played an 
important role in directing that policy development.3 
If one were to seek to observe one of these laboratories in action - to witness 
the interaction of the courts, the people, and the elected representatives of the 
people in the development of policy - one would be hard pressed to find a better 
state in which to do so than Florida. The state of Florida has had in place since 
Scott R. Bauries is a federal appellate law clerk and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Florida. 
1. E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ( J. Brandeis, dissenting). 
2. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), ended what 
several scholars call the first wave of education finance reform litigation. See M. Heise, "State Constitu- 
tions, School Finance Litigation, and the 'Third Wave': From Equity to Adequacy," Temple Law Review 68 
(1995): 1151, 1152. This wave sought to establish education as a federal fundamental right. In Rodriguez, the 
Court declared that education was primarily a state matter and therefore does not rise to the level of a 
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, which does not mention the topic. The second wave began 
contemporaneously with the Rodriguez decision, beginning with the California case of Serrano v. Priest, 
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), and the New Jersey case of Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). Each of 
these cases established that a state constitution's language could be used to provide the strict scrutiny of 
educational equality denied by the federal Constitution. After most states had litigated the equality of the 
education finance systems, a third wave of litigation began in earnest with the Kentucky case of Rose v. 
Council, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), in which the supreme court ofthat state held that the state's educa- 
tion finance plan failed to provide adequately for the education of the state's children, as required by the 
education article of the state constitution. 
3. See R. C. Wood, Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas: Mov- 
ing from Equity to Adequacy," St. Louis University Public Law Review 23 (2004): 531. 
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the time of San Antonio v. Rodriguez an education finance system called the 
Florida Education Finance Plan (FEFP), which makes substantial effort to equal- 
ize per-pupil spending in all of the state's chool districts while recognizing the 
local factors that may necessitate changes in that spending.4 Still, that system has 
been subject to state constitutional challenges. 
This article outlines the two distinct avenues through which the FEFP and other 
Florida school funding statutes have been challenged. Each of these approaches 
involves the education article of the Florida Constitution. The first part traces the 
historical development of the education article, and the second part examines the 
early challenges that were based mostly on the uniformity provision of the edu- 
cation article and the initial failed effort to bring what many would call a third- 
wave5 challenge to the adequacy of education spending under the education 
article. The second part also examines the court's perception of its role in Florida's 
three-branch government and its willingness to fulfill that role in equity and ade- 
quacy cases. This article concludes that the unique referendum process through 
which Florida residents can amend their constitution adds a new dimension to 
the education finance reform process that shapes the arguments supporting liti- 
gation and ultimately may provide a new avenue through which reformers can 
seek their objectives with minimal court involvement. 
EDUCATION AND THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 
Since its first drafting in 1838, the education article of the Florida Constitution 
has undergone several revisions, as has the entire document.6 In 1838, article X 
provided, 
1. The proceeds of all lands that have been, or may hereafter be, granted by the 
United States for the use of schools, and a seminary or seminaries of learning, 
shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest of which, together with all 
moneys derived from any other source applicable to the same object, shall be 
inviolably appropriated to the use of schools and seminaries of learning respec- 
tively, and to no other purpose. 
2. The General Assembly shall take such measures as may be necessary to pre- 
serve from waste or damage all land so granted and appropriated to the purpose 
of education.7 
4. See Fla. Stat. §1011.60 et seq. 
5. Heise, State Constitutions,' 1153. 
6. The people of Florida have lived under six different constitutions, with the most recent being rati- 
fied in 1968. 
7. Florida Constitution, art. X (1838). 
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In 1861 and 1865, the people of Florida ratified two new constitutions, but nei- 
ther made any changes to the education article. Then, in 1868, the people moved 
education to article VIII and added several more sections providing for a state 
superintendent,8 a common school trust fund,9 state property tax millage and 
local effort requirements,10 and a state board of education.11 The people also 
added the following two sections: 
1. It is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the educa- 
tion of all the children residing within its borders, without distinction or pref- 
erence. 
2. The Legislature shall provide a uniform system of Common schools, and a 
University, and shall provide for the liberal maintenance of the same. Instruc- 
tion in them shall be free.12 
When Reconstruction e ded, Florida ratified a fifth constitution. That consti- 
tution again moved the education article, this time to article XII, added several 
new sections,13 changed most of the others to update them,14 and deleted section 
1 along with the requirement for a state university in section 2, which became the 
new section 1.15 
The people of Florida ratified their most recent constitution i  1968. This new 
Florida Constitution made substantial changes to the education article, includ- 
ing completely eliminating eight sections of the 1885 version.16 Now housed in 
article IX, the 1968 education article provided more detailed enumerations of state 
and local authority17 and streamlined the 1885 provisions relating to taxation and 
8. Florida Constitution, art. VIII, §3 (1868). 
9. Florida Constitution, art. VIII, §§4, 6, 7 (1868). 
10. Florida Constitution, art. VIII, §§5, 8 (1868). 
11. Florida Constitution, art. VIII, §9 (1868). 
12. Florida Constitution, art. VIII, §§1, 2 (1868). 
13. Florida Constitution, art. XII, §§10-15 (1885). One of these additional sections resulted from split- 
ting a former section into two. Section 4from the 1868 Constitution became sections 4 and 9 of the 1885 
Constitution. Aside from such minor changes, the people also added sections 10 and 11, which author- 
ized dividing counties into smaller districts, appointing school trustees, and levying discretionary mill- 
age for capital improvements; section 12, which mandated separate but equal schooling for whites and 
nonwhites; section 13, which forbade the appropriation of any public school funds to non-public school 
purposes, including support for any sectarian institution; section 14, which provided for the establish- 
ment of two normal schools for teacher training; and section 15, which determined the funding source 
for the salaries of different categories of school system employees. 
14. see Monda constitution, art. All, $$2-9 U005J. 1 nese alterations were unirormiy minor, except tne 
change to section 8, which formerly required each district to raise through taxation an amount equaling 
at least half the total amount appropriated to that county from the state Common School Fund. Florida 
Constitution, art. VIII, §8 (1868). The 1885 version converted this requirement to a minimum and maxi- 
mum millage for each county of three and five mills. Florida Constitution, art. II, §8 (1885). 
15. Honda Constitution, art. All (1885). 
16. Florida Constitution, art. IX (1968). 
17. Florida Constitution, art. IX, §§2-5 (1968). 
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the state school fund.18 The new constitution also added the language, "Adequate 
provision shall be made by law" to section 1, replacing the 1885 language, "The 
Legislature shall provide," and added language ncouraging the support of uni- 
versities and other public educational institutions.19 In addition, the 1968 Con- 
stitution eliminated section 13, which had prohibited the expenditure of any 
public funds on any sectarian school, and instead combined sections 5 and 6 of 
the Declaration of Rights in the 1885 Constitution, creating section 3 of the Dec- 
laration of Rights in the 1968 Constitution, which prohibited taking any money 
from the public treasury to aid any sectarian institution.20 
Since then, the education article has been amended twice, in 1998 and 2002.21 
The amendment most important to this article was proposed by the Florida Con- 
stitution Revision Commission and adopted by the people in 1998.22 This revi- 
sion altered the language of section 1 to read, 
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of 
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provi- 
sion for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate pro- 
vision shall be made by law for auniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality 
system of free public schools that allows tudents to obtain a high quality edu- 
cation and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of
higher learning and other public education programs that he needs of the peo- 
ple may require.23 
The supporters of the 1998 amendment drafted it in direct response to a 1996 
Florida Supreme Court case, Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Fund- 
ing v. Chiles?4 Their intent was to strengthen the language of Florida's education 
article to make it clear to both the legislature and the courts that education holds 
a special importance for the citizens of Florida.25 Whether they succeeded lin- 
guistically is beyond doubt; whether they succeeded substantively, however, has 
yet to be decided. 
With this discussion in mind, one can group the broad requirements of the 
Florida Constitution related to spending into two categories. First, and most basi- 
18. Florida Constitution, art. IX, §§4(b), 6 (1968). 
19. Compare Florida Constitution, art. IX, §1 (1968), with Florida Constitution, art. XII, §1 (1885). 
20. Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, §3 (1968). 
21. See Constitution of Florida as Revised and Subsequently Amended, art. IX (http://www.flsenate 
.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?Mode=Constitution&Submenu=3&Tab=statutes#Ao9). 
22. Ibid., 1. 
23. Florida Constitution, art. IX, §i(a) (1968) (as amended in 1998). 
24. Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996). 
25. See J. Mills and T. McClendon, "Setting a New Standard for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases 
the Duty of the State to Make 'Adequate Provision* for Florida's Schools," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 
329, 361-367 (explaining the process by which the 1998 revision was proposed, amended, and adopted). 
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cally, the education provided must be "uniform" and "free." Each of these terms 
has survived the many revisions to the education article, and the Florida Supreme 
Court has in the past ascribed at least some content o them. These terms are well 
suited to the second wave of education litigation strategy. That is, they lend them- 
selves to equality-based theories and definitions. However, until very recently no 
case had focused on how the meanings of these terms have changed now that 
other modifying words appear with them in a list. The terms efficient, safe, secure, 
and high quality evoke thoughts not of equality but of quality. 
Second, the Florida Constitution makes it a "paramount duty" of the Legisla- 
ture to "make adequate provision" for education, which is a "fundamental value" 
of Florida's people. Again, no case has construed the nature of the duty that such 
language imposes on the legislature, but the language seems well suited to a qual- 
ity- or adequacy-based challenge to Florida's educational funding system, resem- 
bling the cases that make up the so-called third wave of reform litigation. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA^ SYSTEM OF 
SCHOOL FINANCE 
Equity-Based Challenges 
Unlike the highest courts of many states,26 Florida's Supreme Court has in the 
past shown great deference to the legislature in interpreting the education arti- 
cle. The substance of the uniformity provision has been litigated far more than 
any other in the education article, but the court has never fashioned a strict rule 
of equality, or even one of equity. The court first gave content o the term in the 
1939 case of State ex rei Clark v. Henderson, in which it held that uniform eant 
"established upon principles that are of uniform operation throughout the 
state."27 This tautology did little to establish any meaningful standard by which 
legislative actions toward education could be judged. Accordingly, Florida courts 
heard no new challenges based on the uniformity provision until 1973.28 
In Lee County v. Askew, a school district asked the Florida Supreme Court to 
declare that the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP), Florida's then-current 
system of school funding, failed to meet the education article's mandate for a uni- 
form system of public schools.29 Without much discussion or any citation to other 
case law, the court held that the system passed constitutional muster. The court 
26. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Robinson, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
27. State ex rei. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351 (Fla. 1939). 
28. District Sch. Bd. of Lee County v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973). 
29. Ibid., 273. 
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found that the program's provision of a "uniform expenditure per teaching unit 
throughout the State regardless of the tax base of the various counties" clearly met 
the constitution's requirement for uniformity.30 
Interestingly, while the Askew case was pending, the Florida legislature was 
already reforming and fine-tuning the MFP in response to the then-recent Cali- 
fornia case Serrano v. Priest.51 Thus, although the plaintiffs lost in court on the 
question of the MFP's constitutionality,32 the legislature ultimately made changes 
to the MFP that probably would have resulted from a court decision favorable to 
the plaintiffs.33 Among these were switching from aper-unit model to a per-pupil 
model, adjusting the per-pupil allotment o reflect the special needs of each pupil, 
and adjusting each county's per-pupil allotment based on local cost-of-living fac- 
tors.34 The MFP became the FEFP not because of court-ordered reform but 
because of proactive thinking in the legislature. 
Florida courts have had a few opportunities to further define the meaning of 
the uniformity provision since Askew, but the courts have never used any of these 
opportunities to establish strict equality, or even simple equity, as a measure of 
constitutionality. In School Board of Escambia County v. State, a challenge to the 
FEFP's provision allowing school districts to levy discretionary millage, the 
Florida Supreme Court specifically declined to hold that the uniformity provi- 
sion mandated equality. Instead, the court held that uniformity means that the 
separate parts of the school system "operate subject to a common plan or serve a 
common purpose."35 This definition seems to indicate that even substantial 
inequalities would be constitutionally permissible as long as the state's chool dis- 
tricts hare the same goals and operate under the same mandates. 
Later, in two impact fee cases, the court developed the position that it seemed 
to favor until very recently of leaving the definition of constitutional terms up 
to the legislature. In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass 'n, the court 
considered whether the imposition of impact fees on new construction violated 
the uniformity provision or the "free public schools" provision of the education 
article. As to the "free public schools" provision, the plaintiffs contended that an 
impact fee amounts to an attendance fee, and charging tuition for public school 
30. Ibid. 
31. B. Staros, "School Finance Litigation in Florida: A Historical Analysis," Stetson Law Review 23 (1994): 
497» 506. 
32. The constitutional issue actually was a very small part of the case. The ultimate issue was whether 
the state could override the property valuation decisions of local tax assessors in the pursuit of greater 
fiscal equity. Askew, 278 So. 2d, 274. The court held that the state's unilateral alteration of local valuation 
decisions violated the Florida Constitution (p. 275). 
33. Staros, "School Finance Litigation 
" 
506-507. 
34. Fla. Stat., §1011.60 et seq. 
35. School Board of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1977), 837. 
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attendance, ven indirectly, would conflict with the Florida Constitution.36 The 
court held that severing any provision from the ordinance that allowed home- 
owners without children to opt out of the fee would preserve the ordinance's 
constitutionality.37 
As to the uniformity provision, the plaintiffs contended that each county was 
required to draw its school funding from the same sources; otherwise, funding 
could not be uniform. The court rejected this contention, holding that the Florida 
Constitution did not appear to mandate any particular funding source, nor did it 
prohibit any use of unique sources. Indeed, the court held that the use of impact 
fees might constitute an important means by which fast-growing counties main- 
tain uniformity when ordinary funding sources cannot keep up with the pace of 
development and the need for new facilities. As a definition of uniformity, the court 
merely adopted the definition ithad proffered in its Escambia County decision.38 
The last 20th-century case in which the court had an opportunity to ascribe 
any meaningful content o the uniformity provision was Florida Department of 
Education v. Glasser. In that case, a school board challenged the FEFP's limitations 
on the ability of county officials to levy nonvoted iscretionary millage as a vio- 
lation of the uniformity provision. The district argued that it was empowered to 
assess nonvoted iscretionary millage in excess of the FEFP's limits without addi- 
tional enabling legislation and that the FEFP's limits therefore were uncon- 
stitutional. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is the legislature's 
constitutional prerogative to specifically authorize local taxation, and an author- 
ization like the one in the FEFP, which contains limits, cannot be unconstitutional. 
Then the court considered the district's contention that it must further define the 
uniformity provision of the education article. The court declined to do so, hold- 
ing that the legislature must give the provision its content and meaning.39 
The Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the uniformity provision has ranged 
over the years from Hendersony where it reluctantly offered a "definition" that 
yielded little guidance, to Glasser, where it adopted what appeared until recently 
to be its favored approach to interpreting the education article so as to defer to 
the legislature. The Florida Supreme Court has very recently granted substantial 
meaning to the language in the education article mandating a "uniform . . . sys- 
tem of free public schools."40 However, the plaintiffs in this case did not pursue 
an equity theory. The court's treatment of the uniformity provision in the 20th 
century in equity cases foreshadowed its treatment of other provisions of the 
36. Si. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, 583 So. id 635 (Fla. 1991)» 637. 
37. Ibid., 640. 
38. Ibid., 641. 
39. Fionda Department of Education v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1993), 946-947. 
40. See Bush v. Holmes, 191 So. 2d 392-413 (Fia. 2006). 
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education article during the failed attempt in the 1990s to challenge the adequacy 
of education spending. 
Adequacy-Based Challenge 
The Florida Supreme Court has heard only one challenge to the state's education 
finance system based on adequacy of spending. In Coalition for Adequacy and Fair- 
ness in School Funding v. Chiles, the plaintiffs brought what is commonly classi- 
fied as a third-wave challenge to the FEFP, contending that the level of per-pupil 
spending in the state did not meet the requirements of the education article. The 
plaintiffs also sought to have education classified as a "fundamental right" under 
the Florida Constitution.41 Unlike the equity-based challenges discussed, which 
were based mostly on the "uniform system" language of the education article, the 
complaint in Chiles was based on the "adequate provision" language.42 The plain- 
tiffs contended that the phrase "adequate provision" imposed requirements on 
the legislature that were separate from and additional to the requirements 
imposed by the "uniform" language.43 The court disagreed, holding that the court 
could not enforce the adequacy requirement without reference to the uniformity 
requirement, which had always been interpreted deferentially.44 
The court also considered and rejected the plaintiffs' argument that interpret- 
ing the adequacy provision would not violate Florida's firmly rooted separation 
of powers doctrine.45 The court explained that giving content o the words "ade- 
quate provision" by striking down the current level of educational funding would 
cause the court to impermissibly intrude on the clearly mandated legislative func- 
tion of budgeting.46 In other words, the court would be required to "subjectively 
evaluate the Legislature's value judgments as to ... spending priorities."47 The 
court then expanded on its reasoning, holding that the case presented a nonjus- 
ticiable political question.48 
The plaintiffs had attempted to counter the constitutional separation of pow- 
ers mandate by arguing that the mandate implied an exception for violations of 
the constitution itself.49 After applying the well-known test from Baker v. Carr,50 
41. Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. id 400, 402 (Fla. 1996). 
42. Ibid., 405. 
43. Ibid., 406. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid., 407. Unlike the federal doctrine or separation of powers and its close cousin, the political ques- 
tion doctrine, the Florida mandate for strict separation of powers is explicit in the state constitution. 
Florida Constitution, art. II, §3 (1968). 
46. Ibid., 406-407. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid., 408. 
49. Ibid., 407. 
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
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though, the court disagreed.51 That test has six factors, and the court is required 
to weigh those factors together to determine whether they generally tend toward 
justiciability: 
(1) A textually demonstrable commitment ofthe issue to a coordinate political 
department; 
(2) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the 
issue; 
(3) The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination fa 
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; 
(4) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; 
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; and 
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.52 
The court in Chiles focused only on the first wo factors.53 The court held that 
the constitution mandated that the legislature was to determine the adequacy of 
education spending because the phrase "by law" in both the adequacy provision 
and the appropriations clause referred tothe legislature's discretion.54 Thus, there 
was a textually demonstrable commitment to the legislature of the issue of deter- 
mining the adequacy of education spending. In addition, the court held that the 
plaintiffs had offered no judicially manageable standard for determining ade- 
quacy that would not cause the court to intrude on the legislative functions of 
making appropriations and setting spending priorities.55 
ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA COURTS' APPROACH TO 
EDUCATION FINANCE CASES 
The court's justiciability holding in Chiles can be explained in part by contrast- 
ing the concepts of equity and adequacy in their operational senses. The court 
approved of the state's argument hat, unlike the word uniform, which merely 
51. Chiles, 680 So. 2(1, 408. 
52. Baker, 369 U.S., 209. 
53. Chiles, 680 So. 2d, 408. 
54. Ibid. The court did not specifically articulate its reasoning, but it indicated that the Florida Con- 
stitution made two textual commitments to the legislature of determining the adequacy of education 
spending: one in the appropriations clause in article VII, §1, and the other in the phrase "by law" in the 
education article. 
55. Ibid. 
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means "a lack of substantial variation," the word adequate can be defined only 
subjectively.56 The court clearly felt uncomfortable overruling the subjective 
judgments of elected political representatives with its own subjective judgment. 
One could reasonably conclude that the court therefore would have no problem 
passing judgment on a challenge to the equality of educational spending in the 
state, but the court has shown similar eluctance in equity cases to grant the word 
uniform any specific content. This reluctance probably stems from the fact that 
courts are understandably uncomfortable with the idea of ordering elected leg- 
islators to appropriate more money, which is only a small step removed from 
ordering tax increases.57 The judiciary's traditional tendency is to view a consti- 
tution as a source of limitations on power, not affirmative duties, and it tends to 
avoid outcomes that require the latter interpretation.58 The Chiles court correctly 
pointed out that a decision favorable to the plaintiffs in that case, merely holding 
the present level of funding to be inadequate, might lead to perpetual court super- 
vision over the legislature's appropriations, blurring the line between the legisla- 
tive and judicial branches.59 
The Voucher Case: The End of Deference? 
A contrast with another sort of challenge to legislative decision making in edu- 
cation spending in Florida provides insight into the courts' reluctance to enforce 
the education article in equity and adequacy cases. Recently, the Florida Supreme 
Court struck down the nation's first statewide program using public funds to pro- 
vide students with private school tuition vouchers: the Opportunity Scholarship 
Program.60 
By its text, the Florida Constitution clearly and unambiguously forbids any 
spending of public funds to directly or indirectly aid any religious institution.61 
Nevertheless, Florida has in place several programs that effect indirect ransfers 
of public funds to religious schools by granting private school tuition vouchers 
to the parents of Florida school children.62 Many expected that the court, if it 
struck down the Opportunity Scholarship Program, would do so based on this 
"no aid to sectarian institutions" provision. However, the court decided the case 
56. Ibid. 
57. This is not to say that such orders have not come from courts in education finance cases; they have, 
but the results have not been consistent. Compare Robinson, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), with Rose, 790 S.W.2d 
186 (Ky. 1989). 
58. See Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668, 673 (Fla. ist DCA 2000). 
59. Chiles, 680 So. 2d, 407. 
60. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
61. Florida Constitution Declaration of Rights, §3 (1968). 
62. E.g., Fla. Stat., §1002.38 (2003). 
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on education article grounds, interpreting both the uniformity provision and the 
"free public schools" language that had been left substantially untouched by ear- 
lier Florida courts.63 
The court began by interpreting the "system of free public schools" language 
as implying a mandate of exclusivity.64 That is, the court held that the language 
of the education article proscribed the provision of education by the Florida leg- 
islature through any means other than a "system of free public schools."65 Because 
the private schools accepting vouchers were not part of Florida's public schools, 
the court reasoned, the legislature's provision of education through them violated 
the constitution's implied limitation of exclusivity. 
The court then invalidated the Opportunity Scholarship Program on the alter- 
native ground that it stood in violation of the uniformity provision.66 Without 
specifically defining the word uniform, the court held that the program provided 
no assurance that he inclusion of private schools within Florida's publicly funded 
"system" would not destroy the uniformity of the system.67 In fact, the court rea- 
soned, it was virtually certain that the system could not be considered "uniform" 
in light of the voucher program.68 The court cited the lack of state oversight, dif- 
ferences in teacher credential requirements, differences incurriculum andates, 
and the lack of background checks of private school employees as examples of 
63. Holmes, 929 So. 2<d, 392-413. It is likely that the court chose to avoid the "no aid" provision because 
it may have been borne of religious bigotry. At the time of the provision's first appearance in the educa- 
tion article, many states had adopted or were adopting similar provisions to prevent public funds from 
aiding Catholic institutions. A federal constitutional amendment was even proposed, and it is known 
today as the Blaine Amendment. The Blaine Amendment never passed federally, but state versions at least 
began as its ideological offspring. Deciding the case on "no aid" clause grounds, then, would have exposed 
the court's ruling to a possible reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
equal protection clause, in the mold of Rotner v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996), in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado Constitution provision that made it illegal to enact legislation to 
protect homosexuals from discrimination. It is possible that the rewriting of the "no aid" clause in the 
1968 Florida Constitution has removed the taint of earlier religious bigotry, but it is just as likely that the 
Florida Supreme Court did not want to see its ruling tested on Blaine Amendment grounds. 
64. Ibid., 407. 
65. Ibid. One of the more interesting debates surrounding the court's reasoning involves its use of two 
legal maxims of interpretation, one of which holds that related provisions should be read in pari mate- 
ria, or as one related whole, and the other of which holds that the expression of one thing implies the 
exclusion of alternatives to that thing (expressio unius est exclusio alterius), to interpret the language of 
the education article. The dissent devotes much of its criticism to this technique (Ibid., 419-423, J. Bell, 
dissenting). The use of these canons of statutory construction, as they are called, marks a dramatic shift 
in the court's orientation toward ascribing meaning to the education article. Where the court was once 
very reluctant o apply even clear provisions, it now appears to be willing to supply meaning that must 
be inferred. The difference between interpreting the constitution's limitations, as opposed to its com- 
mands, is the most likely explanation for this shift. 
66. Ibid., 410. 
67. Ibid., 409. 
68. Ibid., 410. 
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nonuniformity.69 Obviously, the court's reasoning in Bush indicates a marked 
change from its earlier approach to the uniformity provision, exemplified in the 
Escambia County and St. Johns decisions. 
One question that sheds light on the likely future treatment of equity and ade- 
quacy suits by the Florida Supreme Court is why the case was not dismissed on 
separation of powers grounds or as a nonjusticiable political question. The answer 
is readily apparent. Unlike in the equity or adequacy cases brought in the 20th 
century, the court in Bush was not asked to order the legislature to take any affir- 
mative action, such as increasing or equalizing funding. Nor was the court placed 
in the position of mandating that which the legislature ordinarily has discretion 
to decide, such as the priority placed on education relative to other state func- 
tions or the propriety of raising additional state revenues. Instead, the court was 
asked to perform its most traditional function: determining whether legislative 
action exceeds constitutionally imposed limitations on its power. 
Simply put, the Florida separation of powers doctrine was not implicated. Dis- 
missal on political question grounds also would have been inappropriate because 
determining whether legislative action exceeds constitutional limitations, rather 
than being textually committed to the legislature, is clearly textually committed 
to the courts.70 As compared with its reluctance to trample on legislative prerog- 
atives in Chiles, the court understandably had fewer reservations about inter- 
preting the education article in Bush because the case required the justices to apply 
the constitution's limitations, not its commands. 
Because the Florida Supreme Court decided the Bush case in the posture of 
interpreting the limitations and not the commands of the Florida Constitution, 
the case is likely to be of little help to plaintiffs in adequacy - or even equity - 
suits. Even if it could be seen as helpful in terms of the court's decreased diffi- 
dence in the realm of defining constitutional terms, none of the terms defined in 
Bush qualify as adequacy-based terms. Both uniform and free are quantitative 
terms, whereas adequate, safe, secure, and high-quality are more qualitative. Thus, 
because Bush is unlikely to change the litigation landscape regarding Florida ade- 
quacy suits, the question remains whether any of the changes to article IX, sec- 
tion 1 enacted in response to Chiles will alter the court's perception of its proper 
role in cases broadly challenging the FEFP on adequacy grounds. 
69. Ibid., 409-410. Through this reasoning, the court may have exposed the state's 300 charter schools 
to greater constitutional scrutiny because those schools often are exempted both from state requirements 
for teacher certification and from certain state curriculum andates. 
70. Florida Constitution, art. V, §4(2) (1968); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1Cranch 137, 177, 5U.S. 137, 177 
(1803). 
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Likely Effects of the 1998 Amendments 
As discussed, the Florida Constitution Revision Commission set out to address 
the court's concerns in Chiles by amending the education article and making its 
language stronger.71 The amendment to article IX, section 1 adopted in 1998 does 
indeed contain much stronger language than the same provision as it existed in 
the 1968 constitution. The language arguably contradicts the Chiles court's hold- 
ing that education is not a fundamental right by declaring that education is a "fun- 
damental value."72 In addition, the court's misgivings regarding usurping the 
legislature's role in determining spending priorities may be addressed by the new 
language stating that it is "a paramount duty" of the legislature to adequately fund 
education.73 Finally, in keeping with the court's approval of the state's character- 
ization of the word uniform as easily defined, the amendment added several other 
words to the uniformity provision: efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality™ 
Whether the courts will find these words as easy to define as uniform is still unre- 
solved, but placing them in the same section as the word uniform at least visually 
distances them from the word adequate. 
The important question is whether these changes will have the desired effect. 
It is inarguable that the amendment strengthened the education article's lan- 
guage, but the Chiles court did not hold the strength of the language to be deter- 
minative. The court focused much more on the specificity of the language and 
the ease with which it could be operationalized.75 Regardless of how much 
stronger the language of the education article appears to be after the 1998 amend- 
ment, it is still riddled with words that are very difficult tooperationalize, such as 
adequate, safe, secure, and high-quality. It is important to remember that the 
court's main concerns involved crossing a line that divides legislative functions 
from judicial ones. With this in mind, it is difficult toconclude that the court will 
be willing to define and operationalize quality-oriented terms now simply 
because more of them appear in the education article. 
The one aspect of the 1998 amendment that should provide optimism to the sup- 
porters of education finance challenges in Florida is the fact that it was passed by 
71. Several scholars have established a categorization system by which they rank the relative strength 
of the states' education articles based on the duties imposed through the constitutional language. See 
W. Thro, "To Render Them Safe," Virginia Law Review 75 (1989): 1639. Florida's rank in this system has 
ranged from Category I before 1868, to Category IV in 1868, to Category II in 1968, and back to Category 
IV in 1998 and afterward. See also Mills and McClendon, "Setting a New Standard." Whether these char- 
acterizations influence judicial decision making is debatable, but in Florida, at least, the supreme court 
has granted the system credence. See Chiles, 680 So. 2d, 405, n.7. 
72. Monda Constitution, art. IX, §i(a) (1968) (as amended 1998). 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid. 
75. CoahUon for Adequacy & Fairness, v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996). 
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popular referendum. The Florida Constitution provides for its amendment through 
any one of several methods.76 However, each of these methods requires a popular 
vote in a statewide election adopting the amendment.77 The Florida Constitution 
Revision Commission originally proposed the 1998 amendment to the education 
article, and the people adopted it in a general election in November ofthat year.78 
The court in a future case challenging the adequacy of education spending in Florida 
may find it important that it was the clearly expressed will of the people of Florida 
to strengthen the legislative duty to provide adequate funding for education. In fact, 
it is clear that the Bush court found the popular amendment to be quite important 
and highly relevant.79 However, to convince the court to alter the posture that it 
took in Chiles, the plaintiffs in any such case would have to successfully argue that 
the 1998 revision intended to remove the determination fwhether spending is ade- 
quate from legislative discretion and place it with the judiciary. 
The new language in the education article can be read many ways, but it can- 
not reasonably be read as imposing the duties that it mandates on any body other 
than the legislature. In fact, the actual mandate in the amended provision remains 
unchanged, reading "Adequate provision shall be made by law."80 The phrase "by 
law" has already been construed in Florida as textually committing a duty to the 
legislature. No new language specifically requires any action by any other branch 
of government. Thus, to avoid dismissal pursuant to the political question doc- 
trine, a plaintiff in a Florida adequacy case will have to convince the court that 
the sheer strength and volume of terminology in the amended article IX, section 
1, as compared with that in the 1968 version, implies the intent o have the Florida 
courts oversee the legislature's determination ofadequacy. Considering the reluc- 
tance of the Florida courts to read language into the state constitution that places 
constraints on legislative discretion in appropriations, and considering that a 
decision to recognize an implied mandate for court supervision would only force 
the court to define a large number of vague terms, it is unlikely that any plaintiff 
could survive a motion to dismiss the case. 
Swelling of the Fourth Wave 
It is likely that the Florida courts will always hy away from generalized legal chal- 
lenges to the entire system of educational finance in Florida. Considering the ten- 
76. Florida Constitution, art. XI (1968). The legislature, a constitution revision commission, ora con- 
stitutional convention may formally propose amendments (see §§1, 2, and 4), or the people can formally 
place an amendment on a general election calendar through the filing of a petition with the required 
number of signatures (see §3). 
77. Florida Constitution, art. XI, §5 (1968). 
78. See generally Mills and McClendon, "Setting a New Standard." 
79. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 404 (Fla. 2006). 
80. Florida Constitution, art. IX, §i(a) (1968) (as amended 1998). 
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dency of courts to approach constitutional provisions as limitations rather than 
compulsions, it is intuitively much easier to invalidate legislative action in clear 
contrast o a constitutional provision than it is to invalidate legislative inaction 
that fails to meet constitutional mandates. This is especially true when a consti- 
tutional mandate for legislative action is qualified by several inherently subjec- 
tive adjectives, such as adequate and high-quality. It is possible that the popular 
process through which the Florida Constitution isamended may sway the Florida 
judiciary to cross boundaries that it has declined to cross in the past. However, it 
is unlikely that the most recent effort will have that effect. 
A more successful effort to redefine the roles of the legislature and the courts in 
education finance would begin from the premise that, in a suit challenging the ade- 
quacy of education spending, the affirmative requirements of the Florida educa- 
tion article are inherently unenforceable asthey are currently written. The Florida 
Supreme Court has declined to usurp the legislature's function of giving content 
to the word adequate, and it probably will decline to do so for the adjectives that 
resulted from the 1998 amendment. Instead of providing more adjectives or 
stronger adjectives, future reform advocates would do well to change the language 
of the mandate itself. Perhaps the only action required would be the removal of 
the words "by law." If the textual commitment to the legislature were no longer 
present, the court may not be so reluctant about defining the terms that follow. 
Reformers can also look to the subsequent amendments to the education arti- 
cle that contain more specific mandates, such as the 2002 amendment o the sec- 
tion that is the subject of this article. That amendment established specific 
maximum class size limits for all of Florida's public schools.81 In effect, mandat- 
ing specific class sizes mandated what many believe to be a concrete indicator of 
school quality without using vague terms such as high-quality. Reformers are 
likely to be far more successful with such specific amendments because they entail 
no court interpretation and therefore do not implicate the separation of powers 
provision or the political question doctrine. Admittedly, achieving the goals 
sought by the drafters of the 1998 amendment through the methods used by the 
drafters of the 2002 amendment would amount to a piecemeal process, and there 
would be significant disputes over whether a proposed specific requirement 
81. See Florida Constitution, art. IX, §i(a) (1968) (as amended 2002). The amendment s ates, "To assure 
that children attending public schools obtain a high quality education, the legislature shall make ade- 
quate provision to ensure that, by the beginning of the 2010 school year, there are a sufficient umber of 
classrooms sothat: (1) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teach- 
ing in public school classrooms for prekindergarten hrough grade 3 does not exceed 18 students; (2) The 
maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teaching in public school class- 
rooms for grades 4 through 8 does not exceed 22 students; and (3) The maximum number of students 
who are assigned to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms for grades 9through 12 does 
not exceed 25 students." 
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would actually enhance educational quality. However, amendments in this mold 
would be more successful, and they would lead to less frequent, and probably 
more successful, litigation. 
If Florida reformers recognize the success of the more specific form of consti- 
tutional amendment, heir actions in achieving their objectives might one day be 
considered the fourth wave of education finance reform. Just as the emergence of 
the second wave involved a shift in litigation venues from federal to state, the 
emergence of this fourth wave would be marked by a shift of venues from the 
courts to the ballot box. Ultimately, reformers may be able to achieve through 
popular referendum what the legislature is unwilling to provide and what the 
courts have been unwilling to address: a higher-quality s stem of education in 
Florida. 
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